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Abstract. This article considers how over time asylum seekers have been ‘objectivised’ by the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees 1951. International law is predominantly instrumental in nature. Whilst it may often contain ethical aspects and sometimes be 
underpinned by liberal objectives, these are usually secondary in nature, with the purpose of regularising the relationship of states around 
some common aims usually being the paramount goal. In this way, the focus of international law often turns from the ethical components 
of the law to terms, procedures and mechanisms. This arguably applies to Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951. Whilst 
originally conceived for Second World War refugees, it placed at the pinnacle of its preamble the moral impulse, ‘…to assure refugees the 
widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms…’ The Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1967 removed the 
temporal and other limitations, however, arguably this moral impulse has waned as the words of the 1951 Convention have been used to 
control asylum seekers. This article argues that this has objectivised asylum seekers. 
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“We are so alike. Why are you here? We came here to give our child a 
better life. My husband said you’ll love it here, the people are so nice 
and everything is so cheap and it’ll be really exciting. And there’ll be 
so much freedom and choice, but it just meant freedom for them to 
mock us. Five years have passed and you realise you never really fitted 
in. Even though I could never really grasp your way of life, somehow it 
clings to my skin changing the simple things within, and returning 
home suddenly feels frightening…” (Khaou: 2007) 
Introduction: The ‘Subject’ of/in Human Dignity 
This piece is about the personhood and dignity of asylum seekers. It posits that there is a clear distinction 
between the notion of a ‘subject’ and ‘object’, and that some of the asylum provisions that have been adopted by 
contracting states under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (‘Refugee Convention’) have 
instrumentalised, or objectivised, asylum seekers, rather than affirming them as subjects. This rendering of 
asylum seekers into objects has enabled some states to control asylum seekers with stern provisions that have 
sometimes resulted in severe human rights violations.  
1 This is the publication of the WISE project, commemorating the 70th anniversary WWII end, implemented with the support of 'Europe 
for Citizens Programme' of the EU. 
2 Dr. Paresh Kathrani is a Senior Lecturer in Law and PhD Coordinator at Westminster Law School. He has extensive experience working 
in a law firm environment and also teaching and researching human rights law, amongst other fields. Whilst working in a prominent west 
London law firm, he assisted many asylum seekers with their human rights claims. He completed his PhD in refugee law and was later 
appointed a full time member of staff at Westminster Law School. He has participated in a number of research-led initiatives, including 
with the School of Advanced Studies, University of London – and is currently the UK Project Manager of an EU Tempus funded project 
with a consortium of Universities in Europe and North Africa looking at a human rights based approach to higher education in the 
Maghreb and also part of the EU WISE Project led by MRU, Lithuania. He is the Module Leader of Criminal Law at Westminster Law 
School. 
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Concepts such as ‘dignity’ and ‘freedom’ have been looked at as inviolable. (Habermas: 2010) Indeed, they form 
the very basis of the nomenclature of contemporary human rights law and can be found in the preamble of most 
human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. However, whilst human 
dignity does exit, the matter is one of definition. What does human dignity consist of? Does it consist of a 
specific body of rights? How does one enforce dignity? Dignity is a comparative concept. It is this relativity that 
some would argue has generally affected the enforcement of human rights. (Buchanan: 2007) However, despite 
the nebulousness and difficulty of giving concreteness to concepts such as dignity and freedom, that they do 
inhere within human beings is something that most people would not argue with. For example, as Article 1 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 makes very clear: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights.’ 
 
Article 1 of the Declaration actually goes much further than this. It adds, straight after the line in the preceding 
paragraph that ‘[human beings] are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood.’ This conjunction suggests a link between dignity and human rationality - that human 
beings undoubtedly have a strong sense of worth because of ‘conscience and reason’, amongst others things. 
(Gilabert: 2015)  
 
As such, there is a tie between the notions of ‘dignity’, rationality and ‘subjecthood’. (Adorno: 2014) Human 
beings have dignity because they are thinking and rational subjects - and are capable of exercising reason, 
amongst various other human faculties - and allied to this, of course, is the wider existential notion of ‘freedom’. 
It is beyond the scope of this current paper to go deeper into the theoretical meaning of these concepts. Instead, 
the paper’s focus, at this stage, is just to emphasise some synergy between rationality, subjectivity and human 
dignity (McCrudden: 2008) – this is essentially what distinguishes a ‘subject’ from an ‘object’. 
 
Here, dignity fulfills a special role in the enforcement of human rights too, whether it be interpretative or 
teleological amongst others, and enables us to understand the different rights contained in various human rights 
treaties, such as the right to life, right to respect for family life and freedom of expression. It allows for the 
protection of what it means to be a subject leading a life – a rational being ‘endowed with reason and 
conscience’ - and not merely an object as described above. This is, of course, not to say one is bound to accept 
everything that another person does! Acceptance that the other person is human and a subject does not 
necessarily equate to the acceptance of everything they say. (Levinas: 2005) But it does call for some prior form 
of special recognition and respect that they are human: the opposite is to render them into ‘objects’ and strip 
them of their very humanity. 
 
1. The Objectification of Asylum Seekers: Turning those Seeking protection into Objects 
 
However, the above does not always follow in the case of asylum seekers, or those fleeing persecution and 
seeking protection in another country under the Refugee Convention. In fact, the way in which contracting states 
implement the legal terms of the Refugee Convention renders asylum seekers into objects. The furor that 
sometimes accompanies the influx of large numbers of asylum seekers under the Convention, who are often just 
perceived as general migrants, creates a moral panic that leads to the creation of policy and enactment of 
domestic rules that often shrouds their humanity - facilitated by the fact that the Convention does not prescribe 
any legal provisions on how asylum seekers should be processed. (Thompson: 2005) Asylum seekers are 
perceived as an existential threat, a danger to housing, to education - an intimidating ‘statistic’ in the vast swathe 
of migration data and numbers that are compiled by a state. 
 
It is true that the Refugee Convention does contain important legal provisions for the recognition and protection 
of refugees. Article 1 of the Convention contains an exhaustive definition of a refugee for the purposes of the 
treaty, made up of a synthesis of inclusion, cessation and exclusion clauses, and the rest of the treaty then 
contains a body of extremely important rights that are afforded to those who are recognised as refugees under 
Article 1. The most important right is without question the prohibition of expulsion or return in Article 33, which 
says ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
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of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ although this is limited in certain circumstances by 
the next subsection. But it is the absence of any clear legal definitions of the terms in the Convention that has 
sometimes enabled states to implement the Convention harshly. For example, Monette Zard found a restrictive 
correlation between the way in which the exclusion clauses in Article 1(f) of the Refugee Convention were 
implemented in the aftermath of 9/11 and terrorism. (Zard: 2002)  
 
The same can also undoubtedly be said about the silence in the Convention of any legal procedures for 
processing asylum claims. States were reticent to accept any such limitations on their sovereign right to decide 
who enters their territory during the drafting of the Convention and as such, today, they largely decide such 
procedures for themselves, subject to the broad undertaking to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) under Article 35. But, as will be discussed below, because of the 
absence of clear procedures in the Convention, states have been able to invoke very restrictive measures to 
control asylum seekers into their territories. The same can be said of the failure to cooperate with UNHCR. 
(Zieck: 2009) 
 
The reason for this is that positive international law is mainly instrumental in nature. Its primary aim is to 
normalise the relationship between states. What this means is that the emphasis is normally on the words of 
international law - and ethical concerns are sometimes pushed into the background and come second as states 
focus on the words and meaning of treaties. This has often been apparent with the Refugee Convention. Ethical 
concerns have sometimes been pushed to the background and dignity has suffered as asylum seekers have 
become the unfortunate victims of policy. Thereby, asylum seekers have been objectivised – sometimes as a 
mere number or statistic in some information-technology based system developed to make the asylum system 
run more smoothly. (This can be compared to Nussbaum: 1995)  
 
This view that those seeking protection under the Refugee Convention have been rendered into objects, as 
opposed to humans ‘endowed’, as the 1948 Declaration says, ‘with reason and conscience’, adds light to and 
explains the very rigorous measures that have been introduced through time to manage and control asylum 
seekers, such as warehousing and detention, amongst others. This can be linked to what Margaret S Malloch and 
Elizabeth Stanley say: “While the use of detention may be seen as an attempt to deter ‘undeserving’ asylum 
seekers from seeking sanctuary in the UK, this article argues that this practice is in effect a fundamentally 
punitive method to assuage public fears concerning supposed risk and potential dangers to security.” (Malloch 
and Stanley: 2005)  
 
The objectification, or reduction of asylum seekers under the Refugee Convention into mere objects, as opposed 
to subjects with dignity with an existential notion of ‘freedom’ - runs antithetical to the objectives of the human 
rights movement that was instigated in the aftermath of the Second World War. While states, indeed, did not 
sacrifice their sovereign rights, and Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations upholds the sovereignty of 
states, there was a clear acceptance on the part of states of the need to ensure that the horrors of the Second 
World War, when people were stripped of their humanity and subjectivity, did not occur again. As Matthew J. 
Gibney (2006), for example says: ‘“Shamed by the experience of the Jews who failed to find protection from 
Nazi persecution in the 1930s, and desiring to reckon from rising numbers of people attempting to flee the Soviet 
bloc in the aftermath of the World War II, Western nations drafted and signed the United Nations Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees in Geneva in 1951.” (Gibney: 2006) This can be clearly related back to the 
view of dignity alluded to above, encapsulated in Article 1 of the 1948 Declaration, and also the preamble of the 
1951 Convention itself: states signed and ratified the Refugee Convention clearly recognising that ‘human 
beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination’. The preamble of the 1951 
Convention expressly says this. 
 
However, what the enforcement of the Refugee Convention, particularly in recent times, has shown is that there 
has been a tremendous vacillation in the way in which asylum seekers have been treated. Objectification and 
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very reduction of the thinking and feeling subject to vitally a vanishing point because of the silences in the 
Refugee Convention, especially on the terms and procedures, have loomed large. Asylum seekers have been 
reduced to a threat, a danger and sometimes a merely figure. This will be explored further below with express 
reference to some of the terms of the 1951 Convention itself. 
 
2. The Binary Nature of the Refugee Convention and Objectification of the Asylum Seeker 
 
As mentioned, Article 1 of the Refugee Convention 1951 contains an intricate web of inclusion, cessation and 
exclusion clauses in defining when an asylum seeker can be recognised as a refugee. The crux of this defining 
article is undoubtedly its inclusion clause in Article 1(A)(2) which generally says a refugee is a person who 
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it.” The Refugee Convention 1951 was limited in time, however, it’s temporal – 
and geographical – limitations were removed by its Protocol in 1967, so that now it is an open-ended treaty.  
 
The 1951 Convention is largely quiet on the procedures for recognising refugees. Many contracting states have 
their own domestic laws for the purposes of processing asylum claims. It is here that objectification occurs. 
While the Convention is generally silent on procedures, it does require the relevant agent of the contracting state 
who is assessing an asylum claim to ask themselves the question: ‘does this asylum seeker meet the definition of 
a refugee in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention’? This step that has the potential to objectify an asylum seeker 
unless it is done correctly. It is suggested that the drafters of the Convention never intended this definition to be 
applied just instrumentally - but also normatively having clear regards to the circumstances in which the 
Convention was drafted. This distinction is key - the former is likely to lead to the instrumentalisation, 
objectification and reduction of human subjectivity; while the latter its reinforcement. If the agent takes a purely 
formalistic, black-letter approach to the Refugee Convention, and under Article 1 focuses mainly on ‘can this 
asylum seeker prove they have a fear of persecution?’, ‘is there fear well-founded etc’ without affirming and 
recognising the personhood of an asylum seeker, then they risk objectvising the asylum seeker.  
 
However, this is precisely what, as Gibney identifies above, the drafters of the Convention sought to mitigate 
against – the dehumanisation of asylum seekers. As Paul Statham (2003) further adds: ‘Traditionally, west 
European states had small-scale systems for granting asylum on an individual basis to people fleeing 
persecution. Embodied in the Geneva Convention of 1951, the rationale for such a system was a moral response 
to the collective failures of countries to provide refuge for Jews fleeing Nazi persecution before and during the 
Second World War.’ (Statham: 2003) The drafters of the Convention and the Refugee Protocol 1967 intended, 
whilst not solely, that the very humanity of the asylum seekers ought to be taken into consideration, quite 
prominently, in the assessment of asylum claims under the Convention - to reaffirm the close link between the 
notions of dignity and human rationality placed at the pinnacle of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Particularly, there was a strong urge after the Second World War to avert the very dehumanisation and 
objectification of persecuted people who had been treated as such during the War. However, today there is 
undoubtedly some dichotomy in the way in which the Refugee Convention 1951 is applied between the 
formalism of the law and its morality. This poses a very strong risk to the subjectivity of asylum seekers – and 
going back to what was mentioned above, this is largely because of the threats that states perceive they face. 
Asylum seekers face, day to day, being rendered further into objects.  
 
This is principally a question of moral priorities. Those responsible for processing asylum claims are without 
question faced with a number of pressing concerns. They must take national, social and economic reasons into 
consideration. Indeed, as Faisal Al-Rfouh (2000), writes: ‘It is the fundamental, primary, and basic right of every 
state to have its national existence. The renowned jurist Fenwick has opined that the right of a nation to exist is 
also known in international law as the right of national security or self-defence or self-preservation.’ (Al-Rfouh: 
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2000) However, as stated above, the ‘acceptance that the other person is a human and a subject does not 
necessarily equate to the acceptance of everything they say.’ Instead, it is just important to identify, first and 
foremost, that the other is a human being endowed with dignity. But this is growing increasingly difficult in a 
world that is now becoming dominated by processes, statistics, systems and technology, which have the potential 
to reduce people even further. As Martin Buber put it from one view: ‘For a century man has moved ever deeper 
into a crisis which has much in common with others that we know from earlier history, but has one essential 
peculiarity. This concerns man’s relations to new things and connections, which have already arisen by his 
action or with his cooperation. I should like to call this peculiarity of the modern crisis man’s lagging behind his 
work.’ (Buber: 2002)  
 
In these days, an asylum seeker under the Refugee Convention 1951 faces becoming objectified even more, or 
being perceived as an object first and a human endowed with reason and dignity second – a mere number in a 
system that is process-led. Arguably in this process a transfer occurs – the asylum seeker’s humanity is turned 
from the subject to some control-based system or technology that may one day be simply a computer algorithm. 
This is even more likely in an ever changing, globalising and technology-based world. As Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri say, for example, ‘Imperial command is exercised no longer through the disciplinary modalities 
of the modern state but rather through the modality of biopolitical control. These modalities have has their basis 
and their object a productive multitude that cannot bee regimented or normalized, but must nonetheless been 
governed, even in its autonomy The concept of the people no longer functions as an organized subject of the 
system of command, and consequently the identity of the people, is replace by the mobility, the flexibility, and 
perpetual differentiation of the multitude.’ (Hardt and Negri: 2000) This has strong ontological ramifications too. 
What does it mean to be an asylum seeker today? Is an asylum seeker a human being, first and foremost - a 
subject, who is claiming protection on the basis of persecution under the Refugee Convention 1951 – or can they 
be regarded as a statistic? This has a large effect on extent to which they are recognised and afforded dignity.  
 
3. Reconciling Competing Values: Sovereignty and the Need for Protection 
 
However, the view that the personhood of the asylum seeker under the terms of the Refugee Convention is not 
always recognised, and that there is a tendency to objectify or instrumentalise them, is not new. As Gibney 
(2006), for instance, says: ‘When the 1951 Convention came into existence soon after the end of World War II, 
Western states had a relatively clear idea of who was a refugee and thus eligible to the entitlements of the 
Convention. The refugee that concerned the Western states were congruent (in large measure) with their foreign 
policy objectives. From the early 1950s to the mid 1970s the status of the refugee overlapped almost completely 
with that of the defector. Refugees were those that had fled communist states in Easter and Central Europe.’ This 
dehumanisation of asylum seekers is something that we are witnessing across Europe today, despite the fact that 
persecuted people were treated similarly during the Second World War. There has been a tendency in some 
places to perceive asylum seekers as an inert, faceless risk that must be managed or controlled. This may explain 
why some states have built fences and other impediments to segment their entry. (Baczenska and Ledwith: 2016) 
An inherent recognition of their humanity, and the dignity that comes allied with it, would arguably not have 
merited such an austere measure - but another, more moderate approach.  
 
A conflict of values arguably arises. As Kok-Chor Tan puts it: ‘The fact of state boundaries is often said to be an 
embarrassment for liberals. On the one hand, on one understanding of liberal egalitarian justice the idea of equal 
opportunity applies globally to all individuals regardless of nationality and citizenship. On the other hand, taking 
political boundaries seriously means to limit the ideal of equal opportunity to members within a state…’ (Tan: 
2005) Further, going back to what Al-Rfouh said above, states have a right to defend themselves and their 
interests. (Coleman and Harding: 2007) Undoubtedly, this is the sine qua non of a territorial state with defined 
borders and certainly accords with the political and Westphalian nature of a state. (Gross: 1948) States have a 
sovereign right to defend their own interests and values. However, at the same time, human dignity is also a 
value that applies to all – and some states have undermined this in their implementation of the 1951 Convention 
by debilitating what it means to be human by rendering asylum seekers into ‘objects’. 
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Conclusions: Reaffirming the Subjectivity of Asylum Seekers  
 
The instrumentalisation of asylum seekers in order to limit immigration, particularly today, does reveal a huge 
abrogation of the spirit in which the 1951 Convention was drafted. Whilst Chapter 1 of the UN Charter, for 
example, envisaged some balance between human rights principles and state interests, the human rights calls 
after the War also widely affirmed that human dignity needed to be safeguarded – and this was also carried 
through via the schemata of the Refugee Convention that sought to offer asylum to those who had fled 
persecution and met the other terms of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention. The Refugee Protocol 1967 
prolonged this. However, as Gibney and others have identified, asylum seekers have sometimes been affected 
by states for their own reasons – and we are witnessing this today. Asylum seekers have been rendered into 
statistics and data, and also controlled through the erecting of fences and other measures for the purposes of 
limiting them. Such objectification and dehumanisation is still occurring and human subjectivity and the 
existential notion of ‘freedom’ continue to be denigrated - and so does the very notion of human dignity, 
intended to be protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. As Christina Boswell (1990) 
correctly points out: ‘the first way of transcending the assumed conflict between refugee rights and national 
interests is to encourage the development of group identities that incorporate a commitment to liberal 
Universalist values. In other words, the point would be to promote ways of linking desire for recognition with 
generous treatment of refugees.’ As mentioned, this is not the same thing as saying all asylum seekers should be 
accepted. However, in light of the terms and the clear absences in the Refugee Convention 1951, the mere fact 
that they are human and not objects should be at the forefront of every state’s mind. This is, after all, what was 
envisaged after the horrors of the Second World War.  
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